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Abstract
Many laboratory experiments show that people are often altruistic or care for fairness. We present data that 
reveal a darker side of human nature. We introduce the joy-of-destruction game. Two players each receive an 
endowment and simultaneously decide on how much of the other player’s endowment to destroy. Subjects play 
this game repeatedly. In one treatment, subjects can hide their destruction behind random destruction. In this 
treatment, money is destroyed in almost 40% of all decisions. We attribute this behavior to a visceral pleasure of 
being nasty. Under full information destruction is also observed, but rare. In this treatment, acts of destruction 
are followed by immediate retaliation. 
 
Keywords 
Spite, nastiness, money-burning, anti-social behavior 
 
JEL Codes 
C72, C90, D82 
 
Acknowledgements
We thank Jeroen Udo for help in conduction the experiments, and Anick Bosmans and Rik Pieters for providing 
us with advertisement evaluation questionnaires. We are grateful to Benedikt Herrmann, Reinhard Selten and 
seminar participants in Maria Laach, Nottingham and Valencia for helpful comments. 
 
Contacting the Authors 
Klaus Abbink 
CREED, Faculty of Economics and Business 
University of Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 11 
1018 WB Amsterdam  
The Netherlands 
+31 20 525-4229 (fax -5283) 
www.uva.nl/creed 
k.abbink@uva.nl 
Abdolkarim Sadrieh 
Faculty of Economics and Management 
University of Magdeburg 
Postbox 4120 
39016 Magdeburg 
Germany 
+49 391 67-18585  (fax: -12120) 
www.ww.uni-magdeburg/e-business 
sadrieh@ovgu.de 
 
 
 
2
1. Introduction 
The defining figure of neoclassical economic theory, the homo oeconomicus, has long been 
challenged by both experimental economics and social psychology. People are, as we now 
know from many experimental studies, not own-payoff maximizing egoists, but 
compassionate social beings who care about fairness and the well-being of others. They reject 
unfair offers in ultimatum games (Güth et al. (1982)), share their endowment in dictator 
games (Forsythe et al. (1994), Hoffman et al. (1994)), reciprocate in gift exchanges (Fehr et 
al. (1993), Berg et al. (1995)), or punish free-riders in public goods games (Fehr and Gächter 
(2000)), to name just a few instances of pro-social behavior.1 The experimental evidence so 
far overwhelmingly suggests that human beings are of much more ethically inclined than 
neoclassical economists have given them credit for. 
So far, so nice. But, there is a danger of overstating the kindness of human nature. Because 
these deviations from the orthodoxy are interesting, behavioral economists focus on 
environments which are conducive to altruistic behavior. This may create a selection bias, a 
neglect of environments in which humans can indeed be selfish, greedy, uncooperative, or 
even plain nasty. There can be no doubt that nastiness exists. People suffer random violence 
from complete strangers. Property is arbitrarily vandalized. Malicious computer viruses are 
circulated solely to do harm. One can argue that such anti-social behavior is an anomaly, 
committed by individuals from the fringes of society. But quite possibly a pleasure of being 
nasty is present in the mind of everybody. This question is the focus of this study.  
We introduce the joy-of-destruction game. The basic setup of the game is simple. There are 
two players. Each player first earns an endowment, which is in expectation equal for both 
players. Both players can mutually and simultaneously destroy each other’s endowments. 
Destruction is costless and entails no material benefit for the destroying party. Since no 
pecuniary, fairness, or reciprocity motives are present, destruction is most likely due to pure 
spite and nastiness. Note that other conventional motives to choose destruction are also 
removed. We also avoid the experimenter demand effect by embedding the destruction 
choices into a much more cumbersome task, with which the subjects earn their endowments.  
We are also interested in the dynamics of play in this environment, which is why pairs of 
subjects play the game repeatedly. We wish to test two competing hypotheses. The 
opportunity to retaliate could trigger the escalation into an ongoing pointless vendetta. It 
could, however, also have a deterrent effect, such that subjects refrain from destroying money 
for fear of retaliation.  
                                                          
1 The space in this paper, indeed any paper, would not suffice to list all the relevant literature in this field. So we 
only mention the pioneering studies and send our apologies to all other contributors.  
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We use two variants of the game. In one treatment (open), the destruction is ex-post perfectly 
observable. In the other setting (hidden), the destructive action is veiled by an additional 
random destruction. The targeted person can only observe the total damage, but typically 
cannot identify which part was due to the destroyer and which part due to nature. Thus, it is 
possible to hurt someone else without being recognized.  
We do not know any other experimental study that examines the pleasure of being nasty in its 
pure form, but our study does not completely stand in isolation. Despotic behavior has been 
observed in public good games with punishment. Though the norm is for cooperators to 
punish free-riders, there is also a good deal of perverse punishment, i.e. selfish individuals 
punishing contributors (Anderson and Putterman (2005), Gächter et al. (2004)). Like in our 
study, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) set up a game in which participants can reduce others’ 
income without gain. In their experiment, subjects indeed burn money, but they do so to 
equalize payoffs. So the seemingly spiteful act stems from a “good” motive, namely aversion 
to unfairness. In our game we have removed inequality aversion as a possible explanation for 
nasty behavior. 
2. The experimental design 
The experiment was conducted in two pen-and-paper sessions with 40 undergraduate students 
at Tilburg University. Each subject was allowed to one session only and no subject had 
participated in similar experiments. Subjects interacted anonymously and were paid 
confidentially. 
To avoid boredom and, more importantly, experimenter demand effects, the joy-of-
destruction game was nested into a much more time-consuming evaluation task that subjects 
performed individually. The task was to view and evaluate advertisements from popular 
Dutch magazines. The questionnaire used in the evaluation task was developed in the 
marketing department for a PhD project. Subjects received 80c for each completed evaluation 
questionnaire in the open treatment, €1.20 in the hidden treatment (to account for the random 
destruction). Note that because subjects had to work for their endowments, we also avoid the 
house-money effect. The number of evaluation questionnaires that were given to a subject 
varied randomly between 1 and 3. After having completed all evaluation tasks of a round, 
subjects were asked to indicate what part of the income of the other subject they wished to 
destroy. Destruction choices were restricted to multiples of 10c between 0 and 80.  
We aimed at playing 10 rounds of evaluation/destruction tasks. In the hidden treatment time 
constraints only allowed eight rounds. The matching of subjects was anonymous and random, 
but remained fixed in all rounds. Before the first and the sixth round, the subjects completed 
mood questionnaires for the marketing study.  
The random destruction in the hidden treatment was between zero and €1.60, in steps of 
€0.10, each value equally likely. Note that the total destruction was the sum of the 
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destructions inflicted by Nature and the partner. Thus, hiding behind Nature was only partially 
possible. Very high total destruction would reveal to a subject that some of the destruction 
must have come from the partner. 
3. Results 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of destruction decisions over the rounds of the experiment. 
Overall frequencies in the open treatment are low (on average 8.5% of all decisions). Some 
destruction can be observed in the early rounds, but destruction rates quickly fade away. In 
the hidden treatment, however, destruction is surprisingly common. On average, 39.4% of all 
decisions involve the destruction of at least some of the partner’s endowment. There is no 
sign of a downward trend. The difference between the two treatments is significant both for 
all rounds and for the first round separately (Fisher’s two-sample randomization test,  = 0.05 
one-sided).  
Figure 1 
Both treatments show a neat end-game effect, as destruction frequencies shoot up in the final 
round. This is reminiscent of the breakdown of cooperation in the final round of social 
dilemma games. This effect is most often interpreted as a selfish act to maximize own payoff. 
In our game there is of course nothing to gain from burning the other player’s money. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of destruction in euros. The general tendencies are the same. 
There is very little destruction in the open treatment, while in the hidden treatment substantial 
amounts are burned (in total 20.4% of the maximum allowed). 
In each round, each individual’s endowment was determined by the number of ads the subject 
had to evaluate. The question arises whether destructive acts vary with the endowment a 
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participant receives. A subject receiving a low endowment can expect to be poorer than the 
partner (with a two-third probability), so the subject may wish to destroy to establish 
(expected) equity (like in Zizzo and Oswald (2001)). Figure 3 shows that there is no 
noticeable connection. In the hidden treatment, destruction is even highest when the own 
endowment is the same as the opponent’s expected endowment, though no difference is 
significant. This result thus refutes the possible explanation of expected inequality aversion. 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
 
Finally, we check whether destruction choices depend on the total destruction a subject has 
observed in the previous round. Recall that in the hidden treatment high levels of total 
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destruction indicate a higher probability (or even certainty) that some part of the destruction 
was induced by the other player. Figure 4, however, shows that subjects did not noticeably 
respond to the observed level of destruction. There is no correlation between the observed 
suffered destruction and the destruction inflicted on the partner.  
 
Figure 4 
4. Discussion 
In the joy-of-destruction game that we introduce, players can burn each other’s money, but we 
have removed all conventional reasons to do so. No material gain is achieved, no wrongdoing 
is punished, no inequality is reduced. Nevertheless, we observe a substantial incidence of 
nasty behavior in our hidden treatment, where spiteful actions could be covered by random 
destruction. When destruction is open, it rapidly goes away, but the treatment difference 
shows that this decline is due to fear of retaliation, not due to kindness. 
We interpret the high destruction rates in the hidden treatment as indication of an emotional 
pleasure of being nasty. Other explanations are of course possible. Individuals could be 
motivated by comparative payoffs, wishing to increase their relative standing compared to the 
opponent. However, proponents of fairness utility models (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)) usually find that people dislike unfavorable as well as favorable 
inequity. We also observe no effect of the own endowment, which renders this explanation 
incomplete. 
Subjects destroying money might be driven by a motive of “pre-emptive retaliation”. They 
may expect the partner to destroy money and “respond” by doing so themselves. This would 
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imply that individuals may expect a pleasure of being nasty in others, even if they do not have 
this inclination themselves. 
Perhaps our results raise more questions than they answer. The most pressing one, though 
beyond the scope of this paper: How can we reconcile our results with the abundance of 
phenomena that prove the “good” side of human nature? Do the same people, who cooperate 
in dilemma games, hurt others in our game? Or are there “good” and “bad” people among our 
subjects, such that the good people cooperate in other games and just do not destroy in our 
game, while the bad people hurt others in our game and just behave selfishly in other games? 
Or are social preferences context dependent? To answer these questions more obviously work 
on the pleasure of being nasty is needed. 
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